Chapter 6 >The Changing Geopolitical Landscape > East Asia—Japan, China, Korea

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East Asia—Japan, China, Korea

Although East Asian nations have not been prominent among post-9/11 concerns, Americans are clearly attuned to what they believe are important changes in the region. Perceptions of Asia’s overall importance to the United States have declined vis-ŕ-vis Europe, even as the perceived influence of China and Japan, East Asia’s two major powers, is the same as that of Europe. Japan and China seem to be trading places in terms of salience in the minds of many Americans. Japan is viewed as more friendly if less influential than in the past as con-cerns about economic competition have faded, while a watchful eye rests on China as its power and influence rise. South Korea’s importance is up, but views on how to deal with North Korea are mixed.

As mentioned earlier, Asia’s overall importance to the United States relative to Europe has declined (see Figure 6-12), with only 27% seeing Asia as more impor-tant and Europe up from 42% in 1998 to 58% (10% volunteer that Asia and Europe are equally important). Only 41% of Americans see Japan as a more important and powerful leader than it was 10 years ago, while 50% say the same for the European Union. Nevertheless, the perception of China and Japan’s cur-rent influence in the world (6.8 and 6.6, respectively, on a 0 to10 scale) is on par with that of Europe (6.7), and more people view China’s influence as on the rise than that of Europe, with 72% believing China will play a greater role in the next 10 years compared to 60% for Europe (see Figure 6-13).

In another significant shift of opinion, Japan and China are each now seen by the same numbers of Americans (43%) as more important than the other (see Figure 6-14). This is a big change from 1998, when more Americans still saw Japan as more important than China by 19 percentage points (47% for Japan more important to 28% for China). Similarly, Japan and China are now viewed as vital interests of the United States by equal proportions of the public (83%), with the percentage for Japan somewhat down (from 87%) and the percentage for China somewhat up (from 74%) since 1998 and the highest ever since the question was first asked in 1978. As mentioned, the two countries are seen as equally influential in the world today, both with a mean score of approximately 7.

Looking to the future, more Americans see China playing a greater role than Japan. Seventy-two percent of respondents see China playing a greater role in the next 10 years, while only 52% see Japan playing a greater role. Thirty-eight percent see Japan playing a lesser role, up from 29% in 1998 and 21% in 1994.

Japan

At the same time that Americans see China’s importance rising relative to that of Japan, they clearly see the U.S.-Japan relationship as one of friendship and mutual sup-port, in contrast to a U.S.-China relationship that is often strained and possibly threatening. Japan gets a warm 60 degrees on the thermometer, which has been steadily climbing since 1990 and is up from 55 degrees in 1998. Only 17% of Americans have negative feelings toward Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, with 22% expressing neutral and 21% expressing posi-tive feelings toward him (40% do not know). Almost two-thirds of Americans (62%) say U.S. relations with Japan are friendly, while only 7% say they are unfriendly. Relations with Japan today do not even appear on the list of foreign policy problems mentioned by the public. In 1990 they were mentioned by 4%.

The friendlier view of Japan is consistent with its decline as an economic competitor. Most Americans no longer feel as threatened by Japan’s economic power as they once did. In 2002 only 29% of respondents see economic competition from Japan as a critical threat, down from 45% in 1998 and a high of 62% in 1994. For the first time in over a decade, Japan is not per-ceived as practicing unfair trade by a majority of Americans. Forty-seven percent now see Japan as prac-ticing fair trade (the numbers were 31% in 1998 and 17% in 1994), and only 41% say its trade is unfair (55% in 1998 and 71% in 1994).

Despite the perceived decline in Japan’s influence and competitiveness, Japan is still viewed as an impor-tant ally and partner. In line with their perception of high vital interest in Japan, 63% of Americans believe the United States should maintain long-term bases in Japan, second only to support for the U.S. presence in Europe (see Figure 3-5). While 43% of Americans believe the 44,000 U.S. troops stationed in Japan, including Okinawa, are too many, 45% believe the number is about right and 5% say it is too few. Further, Americans see Japan as a reliable partner in the war on terrorism (69%) and do want Japan to exert strong leadership in world affairs, with 51% seeing this as some-what desirable and 15% seeing it as very desirable.

China

Japan’s more amicable relationship with the United States contrasts with a wariness in the U.S.-China rela-tionship. The perception of China as a vital interest has risen from 74% in 1998 to 83% in 2002 (see Figure 6- 16). China’s development as a world power is seen as a critical threat to the United States by 56% of Americans and as either a critical or an important threat by 90%. Relations with China are mentioned as one of the two or three foreign policy problems facing the United States by 2% of respondents.

China is seen as practicing unfair trade by 53% of Americans, while 32% see it practicing fair trade (see Figure 5-2). These are almost exactly the proportions given to Japan only four years ago. Only 41% see China as a reliable partner in the war on terrorism, with 47% saying it is unreliable. While overall feelings toward the country are just slightly cool (48°), China’s President Jiang Zemin gets a chilly 38 degrees, the fourth lowest average rating for the 16 leaders we asked about.

Despite their concerns about China, Americans do not favor isolating or confronting China. Eighty percent favor having diplomatic relations with China and 71% favor having trade relations with China. A bare majority of 51% favor using economic sanctions against China. Only 32% would favor using U.S. troops to counter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan; 58% would oppose, even though 65% of Americans see Taiwan as a vital interest of the United States.

Korea

The Korean Peninsula, long an area of high internation-al tension, is a focus of continuing but somewhat muted concern. Sixty-nine percent of Americans see South Korea as a vital interest of the United States, up sharply from 54% in 1998, perhaps as a result of its being seen as a bulwark against either terrorism or aggression from the North. South Korea’s reading on the feeling thermometer, however, is a coolish 46 degrees, down a bit from 50 degrees in 1998.

Americans are ambivalent about how to handle the North Korean threat. As in 1998, only about a third (36%) of the respondents favor using U.S. troops in the event of a North Korean invasion of the South, unless it is part of a UN-sponsored effort with other countries to reverse the aggression, in which case support rises to 57% (see Figure 3-11). Two-thirds (65%) favor estab-lishing diplomatic relations with the North. But 58% favor applying economic sanctions against the North, and 50% oppose trading with it.