Worldviews 2002 Survey of American and European Attitudes and Public Opinion on Foreign Policy: US Report

Chapter 8 > Leaders and the Public > Gaps Between Leaders and the Public

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Gaps Between Leaders and the Public

Although most or all groups of leaders agree with the public on a substantial number of controversial and noncontroversial issues, there are many more issues upon which the foreign policy preferences of leaders and the public are at odds. A deep divide between American leaders and citizens—especially if such a divide has persisted over the years—could be worrisome from two distinct points of view. To the extent that we want leaders to educate the public, to help citizens understand and thereby embrace the leaders’ views of good public policy, a deep and continuing divide in opinions would signal a failure of leadership. By the same token, to the extent that we want leaders (especially elected or appointed political leaders) to respond to the wishes of the citizenry, a deep and continuing divide between the two would cast doubt on the extent of democratic responsiveness in the making of foreign policy.

The evidence from 28 years of Chicago Council surveys indicates that discrepancies between the foreign policy views of leaders and the U.S. public tend to be frequent and, in many cases, quite large. Rather often, majorities of leaders disagree with majorities of the public. Moreover, the discrepancies or “gaps” tend to be enduring. Many gaps found in 2002 are noteworthy for their durability and staying power over all eight surveys since 1974. Some probably reflect informational differences between leaders and citizens (suggesting a failure of leaders to educate and persuade), while others probably reflect genuine differences in values and interests.

The Frequency of Leader – Public Discrepancies over the Years

To determine the frequency of leader-public gaps over time, we first counted the number of identically worded survey items presented to public and leaders in each of the Council’s eight surveys since 1974. We then calculated the percentage point difference between the public’s and leaders’ opinions (with “don’t know” responses excluded) for each item. Finally, we calculated the percentage of total items in each year on which there were discrepancies (gaps) of 10 percentage points or more and the percentage on which majorities of the public and majorities of leaders took opposite positions.3 The results are displayed in Figure 8-2.

In 2002 there were leader-public gaps of 10 percentage points or more on nearly two-thirds (62%) of all the questions that were asked in both the public and the leadership surveys. On 19% of all questions, majorities of leaders disagreed with majorities of the public. A number of the gaps were quite substantial in size: 18 gaps of 20-29 percentage points; 17 gaps of 30-39 percentage points, and six gaps of a remarkable 40 percentage points or more.

As shown in Figure 8-2, the figures for 2002 confirm a persistent pattern of leader-public discrepancies since 1974. The 62% of questions with gaps in 2002 is almost identical to the average figure for all eight years (63%), though it is lower than the peak frequencies of gaps in 1978 and 1990. Similarly, the 19% of survey questions upon which majorities of leaders in 2002 disagree with majorities of the public almost matches the average level for all eight surveys (21%). These findings are sobering. Leaders have persistently been at odds with majorities of citizens on a fifth of survey questions and have significantly different positions on nearly two-thirds of the questions. One might conclude that leaders need to do a better job either educating the public or following their preferences.

Disagreements Between Leaders and the Public on Foreign Policy

More Leaders Embrace Active Internationalism
Although 9/11 refocused public attention on the world, leaders have consistently been more supportive of the United States assuming an active part in world affairs. Figure 8-3 shows a pattern of more leaders than ordinary Americans supporting active internationalism; the gap in 2002 is 23 points, as compared with 29 or 30 point margins in 1990, 1994, and 1998.

Higher Public Priority on Domestic vs. Foreign Policy Programs
The public generally places higher priority than leaders do on domestic as opposed to foreign policy programs. The public has consistently been more supportive than leaders of expanding Social Security (66% of the public versus 31% of leaders, a 35 point gap in 2002) and expanding government programs to combat violence and crime (71% of the public versus 41% of leaders, a 30 point gap in 2002). Previous Council surveys have revealed greater public support for expanding health care and education as well.

By contrast, leaders place a higher priority than the public on expanding economic aid to other countries by a 45 point margin (59% versus 14%) and are more supportive of economic aid in general by a 32 point margin. Figure 8-4 shows that leaders are more supportive than the public of many types of foreign aid. They are more supportive of increasing aid to Afghanistan (67% vs. 23%, a 44 point gap), African countries (75% vs. 37%, a 38 point difference), the Palestinians (43% vs. 13%, a 30 point margin), and Russia (38% vs. 17%, a 21 point gap). The public’s lesser support for economic aid may result in part from its erroneous belief that the United States spends substantially more on these programs than it actually does. The mean public estimate of the proportion of the federal budget that goes to foreign aid (31%) is a startling 26 percentage points higher than the leaders’ mean estimate (5%). Only 1% or less of the budget actually goes to foreign aid.

Less Leader Alarm About International Threats
The world seems to be a much scarier place for the public than for leaders. When it comes to assessing perceived “critical” threats to U.S. interests, leaders are less alarmed than the public by Iraqi development of weapons of mass destruction (72% vs. 88%, a 16 point gap), and chemical and biological weapons (67% vs. 86%, a 19 point margin). More leaders than members of the public dismiss the military power of Russia as a critical threat (42% vs. 20%, a 22 point difference) and dismiss civil wars in Africa as a critical threat (9% vs. 25%, a 16 point margin). Leaders are also far less concerned than the public about various perceived social, economic, and environmental threats. More ordinary Americans than leaders rate as critical the threat of large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the United States (60% vs. 14%, a 46 point gap); the threat of low-wage competition (31% vs. 7%, a 24 margin); and the threats of global warming (48% vs. 28%), epidemics like AIDs (68% vs. 48%), and population growth (45% vs. 25%).

More Public Support for Steps to Protect the Homeland
The public’s greater sensitivity about threats to the homeland translates into stronger public support for several military measures to fight terrorism than among leaders. Leaders’ support for assassinating individual terrorist
leaders is 22 points lower than it is among the public (50% versus 72% ). By a 16 point margin, leaders are less supportive than the public of having longterm military bases in Guantanamo Bay (56% vs. 72%) or in Saudi Arabia (51% vs. 67%). Similarly, just 40% of leaders favor bases in Pakistan, compared with 56% of citizens. The exception to the pattern of generally greater public support for bases is Turkey, where leaders are more supportive by 15 points (78% vs. 63%), possibly owing to NATO commitments.

While the public does not support building a missile defense system “right away” (32% in favor), leaders are even less supportive (15% in favor), a gap of 17 points. The public lags behind the near consensus of leaders in favor of sharing intelligence information in the fight against terrorism (60% vs. 94%, a 34 point gap), which may stem from its uncertainty about the feasibility of sharing intelligence without compromising American security.

The public’s more intense commitment than leaders’ to protecting the country’s physical safety translates into greater support for increasing defense spending and less support for cutting back on it. The public’s noticeably stronger support for defense spending reemerged in 2002 after a dozen years in which the preferences of leaders and the public were similar.

Greater Public Aversion to Putting Troops at Risk
The public’s alarm at threats to the homeland and its willingness to protect against these dangers are tempered by a consistent aversion to putting troops at risk. Figure 8-5 shows that in 2002 far fewer ordinary Americans than leaders support using U.S. troops in four hypothetical scenarios in which allies are invaded: a North Korean invasion of South Korea (only 39% of the public versus 83% of leaders would use U.S. troops, a 44 point gap), a Chinese invasion of Taiwan (35% versus 54%, a 19 point gap), an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia (51% vs. 83%, a 32 point gap), or an Arab invasion of Israel (52% vs. 79%, a 27 point gap). A greater reluctance among the public than leaders to send Americans troops into harm’s way is a consistent pattern stretching back to 1974.

Less Leader Commitment to International Cooperation
In several areas, the public is more supportive than leaders of relying on cooperative and multilateral approaches to foreign policy. By a 30 point margin (58% vs. 28%), more of the public than leaders say that strengthening of the UN should be a “very important” U.S. foreign policy goal. The public, by an 18 point margin (80% vs. 62%), is also more supportive of strengthening the UN by committing 1,000 troops to a rapid deployment force. But more leaders (89% vs. 64%, a 25 point margin) say they favor paying U.S. dues to the UN in full. This may result from public and/or leader confusion over whether recent payments have satisfied the “full” amount that was owed.

The public’s embrace of multilateralism is evident in its stronger support for participating in the Kyoto agreement (75% vs. 64%, an 11 point gap) and the International Criminal Court (76% vs. 66%, a 10 point gap), even though two-thirds of leaders support both. On another point, leaders disagree much more strongly than the public, by a 17 point margin (24% vs. 41%), with the idea of a division of labor with Europe in which the United States would supply most of the forces in military conflicts while Europe contributed economic assistance after the war.

More Public Support for Safeguarding Jobs and Well- Being at Home
Although the public and leaders both see benefits from the global economy, the proportion of ordinary Americans who see globalization as “mostly good” is 25 points lower than among leaders (61% vs. 86%). Leaders are more inclined than the public (17% vs. 47%, a 30 point margin) to dismiss economic competition from Japan as a “not important” threat to U.S. vital interests. Leaders are also 24 points more prone to dismiss the threat of low-wage economic competition (7% critical for leaders vs. 31% critical for the public).

Ordinary Americans are far more concerned than leaders about safeguarding American jobs and fending off economic competition from abroad. Figure 8-6 shows that an overwhelming 85% of the public say that protecting the jobs of U.S. workers should be a "very important" foreign policy goal, as contrasted with just 35% of leaders. This has been one of the largest and most persistent gaps in Chicago Council surveys; the gap in 2002 represents the widest gulf between leaders and the public since CCFR began polling in 1974.

Immigration—widely seen as a threat to low-wage American workers and as a possible source of terrorism —draws remarkably stronger reactions from the public than leaders. The foreign policy goal of reducing illegal immigration is a far higher public priority by a 48 point margin. The public is substantially more alarmed by immigrants and refugees coming into the United States as a critical threat to U.S. interests by a 46 point margin (60% of the public versus only 14% of leaders). By large, 39 point gaps, the public is more favorable to decreasing legal immigration (57% vs. 18%) and to combating international terrorism by restricting immigration from Arab and Muslim countries 79% vs. 40%).

Similarly, the public is more worried about perceived threats to its well-being from the importation of drugs. By 36 points (81% vs. 45%), the public puts a higher priority on the goal of stopping the flow of illegal drugs. A large 69% majority of ordinary Americans favor using U.S. troops to fight drug lords in Colombia, while only a 32% minority of leaders back it.

The public is also more concerned than leaders with the environment. A 66% majority of ordinary Americans say that improving the global environment should be a very important foreign policy goal, while only 43% of leaders share this position, producing a 23 point gap. More members of the public than leaders see global warming as a critical threat by 20 points (48% vs. 28%). As noted earlier, there is a smaller 11 point gap in support for the Kyoto agreement (75% of the public vs. 64% of leaders).

Greater Leader Sensitivity to Changes in the Geopolitical Landscape
Leaders are generally quicker to perceive changes in the geopolitical landscape. A lag in public knowledge about changing international conditions may help explain why the public is more impressed than leaders with how much influence Japan has in the world, by a 28 point margin (43% of the public vs. 15% of leaders think Japan plays a more important role as a world leader today compared to 10 years ago). As shifting patterns of trade and economic health have elevated the significance of China over that of traditional American allies, the public has continued to see Japan as more important than China by a 19 point gap over leaders 54% vs. 35%). Even more strikingly, a 57% majority of the public favors economic sanctions against China, as contrasted with 28% of leaders. The resilience in the public's mind of geopolitical maps from the Cold War period may explain why 56% of the public, as contrasted with 25% of leaders, favor economic sanctions against Cuba.

With regard to the Middle East, informational differences may have contributed to why leaders are far more inclined than the public to rank the Middle East as among the country’s biggest foreign policy problems (38% vs. 12%, a 26 point margin). More leaders favor the United States actively working to establish a Palestinian state (85% vs. 50%, a 35 point gap) and favor being even-handed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a way to combat terrorism (89% vs. 70%, a 19 point difference). Even as American and Iranian officials have begun to gingerly explore possible avenues for resuming normal diplomatic relations, the public is more supportive than leaders of imposing economic sanctions against Iran (68% vs. 51%, a 17 point gap).

3 - Responses to the open-ended “biggest problems” questions are excluded from these calculations. The “problem” questions were not asked consistently over the years of both leaders and the public. Further, the multiple response categories create difficulties in calculating the number of distinct “questions” (the denominator) for which the proportion of gaps is computed.